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I. INTRODUCTION
Can the policies and purposes underlying the law of puni-
tive damages, products liability, and corporate successor liability
be reconciled in the wake of numerous products liability claims
against corporation successors? This Note explores the theories
and policies behind these fields of law and attempts to reconcile
the imposition of punitive damages on successor corporations in
products liability litigation. Several themes recur throughout
this Note and emerge as the primary theories upon which courts
base successor liability for punitive damages. If the purposes for
liability of successor corporations coincide with the purposes for
assessing punitive damages, courts are justified in holding suc-
cessor corporations liable for punitive damages.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Punitive Damages Defined
Punitive damages are imposed on parties who act with out-
rageous or malicious motive' and are awarded in addition to
1. In RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977), punitive damages are defined
as follows:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct
and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, be-
2
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compensatory or nominal damages. Although some jurisdictions
prohibit the use of punitive damages' and others limit their use
to particular circumstances,4 punitive damages nevertheless
evolved into a viable means for plaintiffs to secure recovery in
addition to the recovery they otherwise would receive.'
B. Purposes of Punitive Damages6
1. Compensatory Function
Historically, courts viewed punitive damages as additional
compensation to injured plaintiffs and based this view on the
notion that actual damages in tort actions did not provide full
compensation to accident victims.7 Although the compensatory
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider
the character of defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the
plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the
defendant.
See also W. KEErON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (punitives
assessed in situations of aggravation, outrage, spite, malice, and fraudulent or evil mo-
tive); Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions: A Fur-
ther Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351 (1983) ("Socially unacceptable con-
duct that significantly exceeds mere negligence is the quintessential element."). Id. at
365.
2. See Bishop v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 814 F.2d 437, 447 (7th Cir. 1987);
Oliver v. Raymark Indus., 799 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Jacobsen, 644 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. IM. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988).
3. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594, 605-08 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1982); In re James Noel Flying Serv., Inc., 61 Bankr.
335, 339 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986).
4. See, e.g., Mixon v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 139, 141
(S.D. Miss. 1985) ("[Plunitive damages are not favored and should be allowed only with
caution and within narrow limits."), aff'd, 783 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1986); Alewine v. City
Council of Augusta, 505 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (under Georgia law, punitive
damages permitted only when authorized by statute), modified, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985).
5. See generally J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE
(1984) (general discussion of the availability of punitive damages); Annotation, Allow-
ance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Case, 13 A.L!R.4th 52 (1982) (discussion
of availability of punitive damages in certain circumstances).
6. See generally Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1 (1985) (discussion of the social
function of punitive damages).
7. See id. at 67-68.
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function of punitive damages has been discounted,8 punitive
damages nonetheless play an important compensatory role.'
They act to "restore the plaintiff's emotional equilibrium"" and
to "restore the plaintiff to the financial position he occupied
prior to the injury by providing a fund for the payment of litiga-
tion expenses."11
2. Retributive Function
Punitive damage awards are used to punish one who has
committed a wrongful act.1 2 Several objectives are met by this
retributive function including the plaintiff's satisfaction in see-
ing the defendant suffer,13 the maintenance of societal morals
and legal standards disfavoring misconduct,1 4 the rewarding of
law-abiders,1 5 and the reformation of law-breakers. 6
3. Maintaining the Public Order
The law enforcement function of punitive damages is some-
what related to the retributive function. Public order is pre-
served by providing a vengeful plaintiff a means of recovery
through civil litigation when he may otherwise choose to pursue
8. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); International
Bd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Norman's Heritage Real Estate Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 727 F.2d 911, 914 (10th Cir. 1984); Huff v. White Motor
Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 297 (7th Cir. 1979); Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (1984) (since the focus should be
on defendant's conduct rather than plaintiff's injury, punitive damages do not serve a
compensatory function).
9. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv.
1257, 1295-97 (1976); see also National Semiconductor Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.,
549 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (D. Conn. 1982) (court held that under Connecticut law punitive
damages are granted as compensation for plaintiff's actual losses, but recovery limited to
expenses of litigation less taxable costs).
10. See Owen, supra note 9, at 1296.
11. Id. at 1297.
12. See Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119
(1986); Schoenholtz v. Doniger, 657 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ausness, supra note 6,
at 38.
13. See Owen, supra note 9, at 1279.
14. See id. at 1280-81.
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unlawful measures of restitution. 17 This prospective windfall
award, in addition to compensation for losses, motivates plain-
tiffs to press their claims.'" Thus, "misconduct is increasingly
punished and deterred."'
19
4. Deterrence of Future Egregious Conduct
The award of punitive damages is a mechanism for deter-
ring wrongful conduct, either generally,2 ° with respect to the
public, or specifically, with respect to the conduct of particular
individuals.2 The culpable party is used as an example to
others, resulting in the deterrence of similar conduct.22 Although
some courts maintain that compensatory damages alone are a
sufficient deterrent, other courts hold that additional sanctions
are needed to discourage tortious conduct.2 The effectiveness of
punishment in deterring misbehavior is a source of constant
study and debate. Effectiveness is dependent on three factors:24
(1) the wrongdoer must know the conduct is proscribed and
punishable; (2) he must be able to alter his conduct to avoid
17. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 70.
18. See Owen, supra note 9, at 1287.
19. Id.
20. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating
that under Ohio law the deterrence sought by punitive damages is general, not specific);
see also Spaeth v. Union Oil Co., 762 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1985) (court held the purpose
of an Oklahoma statute is to punish the defendant and set an example for the public),
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 615 F.
Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court held that under Ohio law, deterence is general and not
specific), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986).
21. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.) (holding that puni-
tive damages were unnecessary to punish the defendant and to deter the corporation
from fixture misconduct), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
22. Other reasons for awarding punitive damages include recovery of attorney's
fees, Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64
(D.S.C. 1979), affd, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981), and recoupment for unjust enrichment,
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
23. Compare Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 383 (1981) ("Punitive damages . . .remain as the most effective remedy of
consumer protection against defectively designed mass produced articles. They provide a
motive for private individuals to enforce rules of law and enable them to recoup the
expense of doing so. . . .") with Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482
(D.N.J. 1982) (punitive damages not recoverable under products liability claim because
that claim is product oriented, not conduct oriented, and defendant's knowledge of dan-
ger would be irrelevant).
24. See Owen, supra note 9, at 1283.
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punishment; and (3) he must desire to alter his conduct to avoid
punishment.2 If the plaintiff establishes these factors, the court
is likely to impose punitive damages to deter future wrongful
conduct.
C. Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation
Courts only recently have used punitive damages in the con-
text of products liability,2 6 but their use has expanded consider-
ably since 1977.7 In advocation of expanding the use of punitive
damages, Professor Owen stated:
A legal tool is needed that will help to expose this type of gross
misconduct, punish those manufacturers guilty of such flagrant
misbehavior, and deter all manufacturers from acting with sim-
ilar disregard for the public welfare. The punitive damages
remedy is such a tool.28
Despite the increased use of punitives, critics question the pro-
priety of their use in products liability contexts.2 9 First, critics
assert that the costs incurred by manufacturers of defective
products will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices.3 0 Second, critics fear that overkill will exhaust the capital
assets of corporations faced with unlimited claims.31 Finally, in-
25, See id.
26. Ghiardi & Kircher, Punitive Damages Recovery in Products Liability Cases, 65
MARQ. L. REV, 1 (1967).
27. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1982). See generally Note, Allowance of Puni-
tive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 613 (1972) (analysis of cases
prior to 1972); Note, Punitive Damages in Strict Products Liability Litigation, 23 WM,.
& MARY L. REV. 333 (1981) (survey and analysis of cases prior to 1982); Comment, Puni-
tive Damage Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, the Debate,
the Defenses, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 771 (1982) (analysis of cases prior to 1982 by providing
criticism and historical background).
28. Owen, supra note 9, at 1259-60.
29. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-41 (2d Cir.
1967).
30. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 12-13.
31. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) ($6.2 million
punitive damages award based on fraud); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, 738
P.2d 1210 (1987) ($7.5 million punitive damages award for Dalkon Shield injury). De-
spite some courts' willingness to affirm large punitive damage awards, punitive damages
are not intended to bankrupt manufacturers. See Sales, supra note 1, at 370; Note, The
Punitive Damages Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple Punishment,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 153 (1984).
[Vol. 40
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surance covering punitive damages often is limited or unavaila-
ble; therefore, many innocent shareholders may lose their invest-
ments because of the sins of management."2
Critics also assert that punitive damages violate the guaran-
tees of due process, the commerce clause, and the right to pro-
tection against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the United States Constitution23 These factors,
coupled with the inherent incompatibility of punitive damages
with the tort theories behind strict liability,3 4 comprise a strong
opposition to punitive damage awards against manufacturers of
defective products.
The most recent reservations about punitive damages arise
in the context of mass tort litigation.35 Opponents of the imposi-
tion of punitive damages on mass tort defendants argue that the
nature of a single plaintiff's underlying compensatory claim and
the possibility of multiple defendants seeking compensation for
the same injuries make punitive damages "inapropos and insup-
32. Ausness, supra note 6, at 83. See generally Comment, Punitive Damages In-
surance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart Out of "Smart Money," 40 U. MIAit L. REV.
979 (1986) (analysis of the tensions between the doctrines of punitive damages and
insurance).
33. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599 F. Supp. 376, 379-80 (N.D.
Iowa 1984); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377-78 (E.D. Pa.
1982), afl'd, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Unified School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 6
Kan. App. 2d 346, 629 P.2d 196 (1981). See generally Jeffries, A Comment on the Con-
stitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139 (1986) (arguing that successor
punitive damage awards violate the eighth amendment); Wheeler, The Constitutional
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983) (arguing
that reform is needed to bring punitive damage awards into compliance with due process
requirements and the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments); Comment, Criminal Safe-
guards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CH. L. REV. 408 (1967) (arguing
that constitutional safeguards should protect defendants subject to punitive damages).
34. Strict liability has no-fault underpinnings. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 47.
The focus normally is on the condition of the product rather than the conduct of the
supplier-defendant. See Note, Recognizing Products Liability Claims at Dissolution:
The Compatibility of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1048
(1987).
35. See Froud v. Celotex, 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982) (defendants
argued the impropriety of punitive damages in mass tort claims, but court declined to
relieve them of liability merely because they seriously injured a large number of people),
rev'd, 96 Ill. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983); PROSSE.R & KEETON, supra note 1; Seltzer,
Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Effi-
ciency ahd Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37 (1983); Sullivan, Multiple Punitive Awards
in Huge Cases Pose Risks, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1985, at 15, Col. 1; Comment, Class Ac-
tions in New York: Recovery for Personal Injury in Mass Tort Cases, 30 SYRAcUSE L.
REV. 1187 (1979).
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portable" 6 in strict tort liability actions. Opponents fear that
each plaintiff could recover an excessive award of punitive dam-
ages and, contrary to public policy, bankrupt the defendant.
Multiplicity of suits for damages resulting from a single product
of a particular design line, opponents argue, is contrary to the
purposes punitive damages should serve.
3 7
These criticisms have not gone unanswered, and many com-
mentators assert convincing counterarguments and suggestions
for reform. 8 Common suggestions include increasing the availa-
bility of products liability insurance, 39 using remittitur more lib-
erally,40 and instructing the jury of other awards that were made
under similar circumstances.41
In reconciling the theories behind punitive damages and
strict liability, one commentator suggested that an objective de-
cision about the manufacturer's state of mind should be made
and that punitive damages only should be imposed against the
manufacturer if its conduct reflects a flagrant indifference to
public safety.42 This approach considers both the individual
wrongdoer's mental state of malice or recklessness and the focus
of strict liability on the condition of the product.
4 3
As a counterargument to the proposition that innocent
36. Sales, supra note 1, at 388.
37. See id. at 370. But see Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d
437 (1980) (the need for punitive damages is as real as the danger of multiple awards).
38. See, e.g., Comment, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 895 (1976).
39. See, e.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 368, 469 A.2d
655, 665 (1983), vacated, 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985); Schiff, Products Liability
and Successor Corporations-Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer
Through Increased Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
1000, 1024 (1980). But see Burrell & Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 M~aQ.
L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1978) (the argument against allowing insurance coverage is that the
defendant is permitted by law to divert his punitive damages obligation to an insurer
and, therefore, is shielded from penalty).
40. See, e.g., Martin, 322 Pa. Super. at 368, 469 A.2d at 665; see also O'Gilvie v.
International Playtex, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985) (remittitur of punitives al-
lowed on condition that product be removed from market place), aff'd, 821 F.2d 1438
(10th Cir. 1987).
41. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 6, at 98. The defendant's expense in satisfying
other punitive damage claims is a relevant factor that may be introduced at trial. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1977).
42. See Owen, supra note 9, at 1268-71.
43. Professor Owen contends that the incompatibility argument has "superficial
appeal" but cannot withstand analysis. See id. at 1269-70.
[Vol. 40
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shareholders will suffer because of management misconduct,""
the court in Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.45 observed that
shareholders elect management and the board of directors.46 Ac-
cordingly, shareholders can withdraw their investments, deter
managerial misconduct, and change questionable company
policies.4
In response to the fear of overkill, which may not be as seri-
ous as critics suggest,48 commentators suggest changes in trial
procedure, 49 limitations on the size of individual awards,50 limi-
tations on the aggregate liability with a single punitive damage
award, 51 and the use of a punitive damage class action.
5 2
Both opponents and proponents of the use of punitive dam-
ages in products liability litigation have strong arguments sup-
porting their respective positions. Whether adopting the view
44. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967).
45. 322 Pa. Super. 348, 469 A.2d 655 (1983), vacated, 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088
(1985).
46. See id. at 368-69, 469 A.2d at 664; see also Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Punitive damage awards are a risk that accom-
panies investment .. ").
47. See Martin, 322 Pa. Super. at 368-69, 469 A.2d at 664. The court in Moran, 691
F.2d 811, maintained that punitive damages are a risk that accompanies investment and
that "[i]nvestors may typically place their money where they choose and withdraw it
when they wish. The prospect of ultimate liability ... may encourage investors to en-
trust their capital to the most responsible concerns." Id. at 817.
48. See Dukes v. Raymark Indus., 801 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1986) (overkill doctrine
did not apply to bar recovery of punitive damages in asbestosis case), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1975 (1987).
49. See Ausness, supra note 6, at 93. Ausness' suggestions include requiring a
higher standard of proof, as required for criminal sanctions, trial bifurcation, and judicial
assessment of punitive damage awards.
50. See id. at 96.
51. See id. at 98.
52. See id. at 100. Ausness proposes that the punitive damages class action is the
best measure for reform. See also Mullinex, Class Resolution of the Mass - Tort Case: A
Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 Tsx. L. REv. 1039, 1045-46 (1986) (proposal for fed-
eral mass-tort procedure act based on three premises: (1) act achieves economies of time,
effort, and expense without sacrificing procedural fairness; (2) procedural reform must
take place before substantive reform will be accomplished; and (3) the difference be-
tween mass-accident cases embraced by FE. R. Civ. P. 23 and mass-tort lawsuits re-
quires special attention); Note, The Punitive Damages Class Action: A Solution to the
Problem of Multiple Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 153 (advocating that class action
is best device for administering punitive damages). For a detailed analysis of enforce-
ment of the law through "private attorneys general" and its use in mass tort litigation,
see Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic The-
ory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUhi.
L. REV. 669 (1986).
9
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that punitive damages are inappropriate in products liability or
advocating the imposition of punitives on culpable manufactur-
ers, one must consider the policies and purposes served by both
theories. If all factors pertinent to both are met and the goals of
each are furthered, the result will be desirable and fair."
III. CORPORATE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. Corporate Liability
Corporations, like individuals, can be held responsible for
wrongful conduct.5 4 Although the culpable conduct actually is
committed by an individual within the corporation, the corpo-
rate entity is held liable.5 Beyond liability for compensatory
damages, a corporate entity is held liable to injured parties for
punitive damages on two theories: the complicity rule and vicari-
ous liability. 6 Under the complicity rule, shareholders are con-
sidered innocent parties, and the corporation is held liable for
the intentions and actions of high-level officials.5 Conversely, a
corporation is held vicariously liable for the wanton acts of its
officers, agents, and employees if those persons acted within the
scope of their employment."' Several courts maintain that in or-
der to impose liability for punitive damages on a corporation,
some indication must exist that the employee obtained direction
from the corporation or a managerial employee or that the cor-
53. Owen, supra note 9, at 1299.
54. See Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398 (1921). Corporate liability includes
the known and ascertainable rights of creditors as well as the unknown or anticipatory
rights of unidentifiable persons, for example, potential products liability claimants.
55. Under agency principles, actions of officers, directors and some employees
within the corporation, acting within the scope of employment, are imputable to the
corporation. See Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d
906 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1975),
rev'd, 563 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1977).
56. See Ketterling, A Proposal for the Proper Use of Punitive Damages Against a
Successor, 11 J. CORP. LAW 765, 769 (1986); Sales, supra note 1, at 367.
57. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 909 (1979) allows recovery of punitive dam-
ages against a principal or master when: (a) the principal authorized the action; (b) the
principal recklessly employed an unqualified agent; (c) the agent functioned and occu-
pied the status of manager; or (d) the principal adopted the action as his own. See
O'Donnell v. K-Mart Corp., 100 A.D.2d 488, 474 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1984); Sardell, Corporate
Liability for Punitive Damages, 8 CORP. L. REv. 184 (Spring 1985).
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poration committed, directed, or ratified the intentional act.59
In the context of products liability litigation, vicarious lia-
bility is more justifiable than the complicity rule because the
company that put the product in the stream of commerce and
profits from its distribution is best able to foresee harm and is in
the best position to lessen the product's potential for harm.
Since both high- and low-level officials are held vicariously ac-
countable for their misconduct, "[t]he deterrent effect of puni-
tive damages would be increased significantly ... [and] could
then be expected to result in participation of upper-level officials
in all stages of product design and safety.
60
B. Corporate Successor Liability
1. General Rule of Nonliability and Exceptions
Although corporations undoubtedly are held responsible for
wrongful conduct, the general rule regarding successor corpora-
tions is that no liability of the predecessor is imposed on the
successor unless one of the following exceptions is met:61
(1) [The successor enters into an express or implied
agreement to assume the predecessor's liability;
2
(2) the transaction amounts to a merger or consolidation;63
59. See Dobelle v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 628 F. Supp. 1518 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Hammerman v. Peacock, 607 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1985); Cathay Mortuary (Wah
Sing) Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
60. Ketterling, supra note 56, at 770. See also Note, Assumption of Products Lia-
bility in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 89 (1975).
61. The issue is whether an arm's length purchaser of assets should be held respon-
sible for products previously manufactured and sold by the corporation transferring its
assets. See Schulman, Commentary: Successor Corporation Liability and the Inade-
quacy of the Product Line Continuity Approach, 28 CORP. PaAc. COMMENTATOR 588
(1986), published originally in 31 WAYNE L. REv. 135 (1984); Annotation, Products Lia-
bility: Liability of Successor Corporation for Injury or Damage Caused by Product Is-
sued by Predecessor, 66 A.L.R.3d 824 (1975).
62. See Bouton v. Litton Indus., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970) (express assumption);
Bippus v. Norton Co., 437 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (implied assumption); Plaza
Express Co. v. Middle States Motor Freight, Inc., 40 Ill. App. 2d 117, 189 N.E.2d 382
(1963) (implied assumption of liability when transferee carried the individual's deprecia-
ble assets on books of corporation at existing book value and issued all stock in exchange
for net assets of the individual).
63. Liability for compensatory damages attaches in a merger or consolidation. See
Tretter v. Rapid Am. Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1344 (E.D. Mo. 1981); State Dep't of Envtl.
Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983).
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(3) the successor is a mere continuation or reincarnation of
its predecessor;64 or
(4) the transaction was the result of a fraudulent or bad
faith transfer of assets.
6 5
Clearly, liability is justified when there is an express or implied
agreement and when a fraudulent transaction has occurred. Con-
versely, the merger and mere continuation exceptions have gen-
erated extensive litigation 6 because of the difficulty in distin-
guishing a pure asset acquisition from a merger, consolidation,
mere continuation, or reincarnation.
The procedures for effectuating mergers and consolidations
are statutory.67 A merger occurs when one corporation absorbs
one or more other corporations with one entity surviving, and
the shares of the original corporation are converted as provided
by the merger agreement.6 8 Various objectives - such as recapi-
talization, elimination of minority shareholders, and alteration
of the articles of incorporation - may be accomplished through
merger.69 Consolidation occurs when two corporations dissolve
64. See Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 100 N.J. Super. 186, 196, 241 A.2d
471, 477 (Ct. Law Div. 1968) (elements relevant to whether the corporation was mere
continuation include: "(1) transfer of corporate assets (2) for less than adequate consid-
eration (3) to another corporation which continued the business operation of the trans-
feror (4) when both corporations had at least one common officer or director who was in
fact instrumental in the transfer. . . and (5) the transfer rendered the transferor incapa-
ble of paying its creditors' claims" because it was either factually or legally dissolved);
Jones v. Eppler, 266 P.2d 451 (Okla. 1953).
65. See Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 La. 743, 70 So. 789
(1916) (court held that gas company's acquisition of all assets, but no liabilities, of an-
other gas company for $1000 consideration was not a good faith transfer).
66. The earliest use of the general nonliability rule and its exceptions was in Chase
v. Michigan Tel. Co., 121 Mich. 631, 80 N.W. 717 (1899). For discussions on the general
rule, see 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORP. § 7132 (rev. ed. 1973);
Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW.,
489 (1979); Note, Products Liability-Liability of Transferee for Defective Products
Manufactured by Transferor, 30 VAND. L. REV. 238 (1977); 63 AM. JuR. 2D Products Lia-
bility § 170 (1984). Some commentators suggest that the traditional nonliability rule and
its exceptions are inadequate. See, e.g., Note, The Inconsistencies and Confusion of Suc-
cessor Corporation Liability in Product Liability Claims: Should Iowa Adopt a New
Approach?, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 161 (1985).
67. See REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT §§ 11.01-.07 (1984).
68. See R. CORLEY, E. HOLMES & W. ROBERT, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS LAW 783
(12th ed. 1983).
69. See Garrett, Merger Meets the Common Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1509, 1511-12
(1985). Once a merger has occurred, the surviving entity assumes all liabilities of each
corporation that was a party to the merger, and "a proceeding pending against any cor-
12
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and a new corporation is created.70 A mere continuation or rein-
carnation of the predecessor closely resembles a merger except
that a mere continuation embraces a sale of assets.
71
Due to the common characteristics of these four methods of
corporate acquisition, commentators have argued that the form
of the acquisition is not dispositive of whether a successor
should be held liable. 2 Other courts have held organizational
form to be the determinative factor.73 The majority of jurisdic-




Courts that have imposed liability based on the method of
acquisition and organizational form use a corporate law ap-
proach.75 These courts employ the traditional corporate excep-
tions stated above, and many have adopted expanded versions of
successor liability.76
First, corporations may be held liable on a statutory merger
porate party to the merger may be continued as if the merger did not occur or the sur-
viving corporation may be substituted in the proceeding for the corporation whose exis-
tence ceased." REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 1l.06(a)(3)-(a)(4) (1984).
70. The effects are essentially the same as those resulting from a merger. See Gar-
rett, supra note 69, at 1512.
71. See supra note 64.
72. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Tift v.
Forage King Indus., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982); Juenger & Schulman, Assets
Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 39 (1975); Ketterling, supra note 56, at
772; Annotation, Successor Products Liability: Form of Business Organization of Suc-
cessor or Predecessor as Affecting Successor Liability, 32 A.L.R.4TH 196 (1984).
73. See Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1305, 1309 (1976). See, e.g., Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 818 F.2d 1405 (8th
Cir. 1987) (nature of the transaction determines whether purchaser of assets acquires
liabilities of seller), aff'd, 831 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1987).
74. See, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451
(11th Cir. 1985); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Co., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985); Johnston v.
Pneumo Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1402 (S.D. Miss. 1987); Florum v. Elliott Mfg. Co., 629 F.
Supp. 1145 (D. Colo. 1986); Roy v. Bolens Corp., 629 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Mass. 1986).
75. See Poole v. Amsted Indus., 575 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1978) (No. 76-2652 Apr. 21,
1978), aff'g No. 1-76-75 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
76. The cases indicate that the de facto merger and mere continuation theories
offer the injured party the best chance for recovery. See Note, Products Liabil-
ity-Corporations-Assets Sales and Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L. REV. 905, 908-09
(1977).
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theory, which results when statutory elements are satisfied. In
these mergers, statutes outline the assumption of debts, obliga-
tions, and liabilities, and the successors have difficulty denying
an assumption of those liabilities.
Second, courts use the de facto merger doctrine as a mecha-
nism for imposing liability on a successor. The case most often
cited for this doctrine, Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,7" held that a
transaction that closely resembles a merger but did not conform
to statutory merger requirements nevertheless may be subject to
the legal consequences of a merger.7 8 The elements that consti-
tute a de facto merger are:
(1) stockholder continuity;
(2) payment by the buyer in its shares of stock rather than
in cash;
(3) dissolution of the asset seller;
(4) assumption of the ordinary debts of the seller by the
buyer; and
(5) continuation of the business."
Courts have imposed liability using the de facto theory even
when the transaction was in the form of an asset purchase.8 0 The
77. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
78. Id. at 438, 143 A.2d 30-31.
79. See Lumbard v. Maglia, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Note, As-
sumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 96 (1975).
80. In Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 370 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975), the court held that even though the transaction was struc-
tured as a sale of assets, the selling corporation was required to dissolve as soon as possi-
ble. Policy considerations required the transaction to be treated as a merger since the
purchaser was best able to bear the burden of tort liability. See also Shannon v. Samuel
Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (de facto merger present when there
was a continuation of enterprise, a continuation of shareholders, the seller had ceased
doing business and liquidated, and the buyer had assumed liabilities necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal operations); Troupiansky v. Henry Disston &
Sons, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (de facto merger occurred when one corpora-
tion dissolved and became a division of another corporation); Marks v. Autocar Co., 153
F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (de facto merger occurred when one corporation dissolved
and transferred its assets, goodwill, and right to use its name to another corporation);
Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d 410 (1965) (merger occurred al-
though parties called it something else); Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 60
N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Ct. Ch. Div.) (court held that it will look behind formal
designations to determine if a transaction is actually a merger), afl'd, 33 N.J. 72, 161
A.2d 474 (1960). But see Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (1963)
(rejection of the de facto merger doctrine).
Several courts have recognized the validity of the de facto merger doctrine, but the
facts of their particular cases did not warrant imposition of liability based on the doc-
14
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de facto merger doctrine encompasses several elements common
to the other methods of imposing liability on successors, but is
solely distinguished by the sale of the corporation in exchange
for stock.81 Thus, the reasons justifying liability in statutory
mergers also apply to de facto mergers.82
The final theory is the extension of the traditional mere
continuation exception. 3 Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.8 4 often is cited as
the first case to expand the mere continuation theory because
the court imposed liability although the defendant corporation
explicitly excluded assumption of the business' tort liabilities.8 5
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co."6 the court also applied
liability to a purchasing corporation that continued the business
it purchased under the appearance of being the same company."
trine. See, e.g., Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974), af'd, 546 F.2d 417
(3d Cir. 1976); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Comstock
v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 209 Kan. 306, 496 P.2d 1308 (1972); McKee v. Harris-Sey-
bold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Ct. Law Div. 1970), af'd, 118 N.J. Super.
480, 288 A.2d 585 (Ct. App. Div. 1972) (since transfer of cash, as opposed to stock, no
liability).
81. See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) (absent a transfer
of stock, the nature and consequences of a transaction are not those of a merger); West-
ern Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (court
assumes stock transfer factor to be determinative).
82. The de facto merger and the continuation exception also overlap to the extent
that they often are treated as one general exception to the nonliability rule. See Phillips,
Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 906, 909
(1983).
83. See Wallach, A Remedy in Search of a Defendant - The Effect of a Sale of
Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REv.
321, 337 n.62 (1976), for cases discussing continuity of ownership.
84. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
85. Accord Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (strong
evidence of continuity of enterprise embraced in the stipulation of the transfer that re-
alty was to be used for continued operations and that the successor was to make neces-
sary efforts to employ transferor's employees; it made no difference that the predecessor
continued to exist for two years after the sale but only mattered that predecessor eventu-
ally became defunct); Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979)
(none of the exceptions applied to impose liability, but court suggested that when there
is a basic continuity of enterprise between the designer and manufacturer of a product
and the successor, the successor may be estopped from denying product's liability for
injuries sustained to the user, despite successor's agreement with the predecessor that it
would not be liable).
86. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
87. See also Haney v. Bendix Corp., 88 Mich. App. 747, 279 N.W.2d 544 (1979)
(court held because the transferee corporation received the assets of the transferor cor-
poration and took over most of its operations, sufficient continuity existed to attach suc-
cessor liability).
15
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Despite the efforts of some courts to expand liability by ex-
tending the continuation exception,88 several courts maintain
that the traditional exceptions to the rule of nonliability are the
only means by which a plaintiff can recover against a successor
corporation.89
3. Tort Theories
Two tort theories have emerged as methods of expanding
successor liability: the product-line approach and subsequent
duty to warn. The product-line approach established in Ray v.
Alad Corp.,90 which is referred to as a "special departure" from
the traditional rule,91 has been the least accepted of the nonlia-
bility exceptions.9 2 The most common reason advanced by courts
declining to accept the product-line theory is that legislatures,
not courts, should decide to enact an additional exception to the
88. See, e.g., Tift v. Forage King Indus., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982)
(mere continuation exception applied to corporate successor of a sole proprietorship
when defendant was substantially the same as the original manufacturer); Department of
Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (Ct. Law Div. 1980).
89. For example, a Georgia court refused to expand successor liability and retained
the common-law continuation exception based on the "identity of ownership" criteria.
See Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283, 285, 328 S.E.2d 726, 727 (1985) (citing
Ney-Copeland & Assocs. v. Tag Poly Bags, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 256, 267 S.E.2d 862
(1980)). See also Weaver v. Nash Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (court
held plaintiff offered no evidence that Iowa courts would expand traditional rules), aff'd,
730 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1984).
90. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). To justify strict tort liabil-
ity against the successor, the Ray court gave the following policy reasons:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original
manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business,
(2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-
spreading role, and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for
defective products that was a burden attached to the original manufacturer's
good will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the
business.
Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80.
91. Heitland, supra note 66, at 491.
92. See, e.g., In re Massachusetts Asbestos Cases, 639 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1985);
Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 211 Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481 (1982); Hall v. Arm-
strong Cork Inc., 103 Wash. 2d 258, 692 P.2d 787 (1984) (good will is associated with the
predecessor business entity, not with the individual products); Sell, Successor Corpora-
tions Liability for Defective Products of Its Transferor-The Product-Line Exception, 4
J. LAW & CoM. 65 (1984).
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general nonliability rule. The court in Flaugher v. Cone Auto-
matic Machine Co. 4 rejected the product-line approach for two
other reasons: the potentially devastating burden it would place
on business transfers and the creation of traps for the unwary. 5
Despite these arguments against adopting this theory, a few
courts have justified its prescription," and one court even has
extended its application by holding a successor liable even
though it did not continue to manufacture the identical line of
products.9
A final tort theory is that a subsequent duty to warn exists
for successor corporations that allegedly had knowledge of the
defective product upon acquiring the predecessor98 and contin-
ued a relationship with the customers of the predecessor.99 The
extent of the relationship necessary to establish a duty to warn
requires a lesser degree of continuity than is required under the
93. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Hernandez
v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979); Griggs v. Capitol
Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); cf. Rhynes v. Branick Mfg.
Corp., 629 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal court declined to adopt product-line rule
without clear indication that Texas courts would do so); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409
So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982); Anders v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 443 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Ct. App.
1983) (fourth corporate owner was too removed to be held liable for product manufac-
tured by first corporate owner); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 294
n.5 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (court declined to expand liability because of the threat of
economic "'annihilation' of small businesses").
94. 30 Ohio St. 3d 60, 507 N.E.2d 331 (1987).
95. See id. at 66, 507 N.E.2d at 337.
96. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indust., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Dawejko
v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981); see also Gibson v. Arm-
strong World Indus., 648 F. Supp. 1538 (D. Colo. 1986) (court held that successor liabil-
ity warranted because successor purchased one complete division of its predecessor so
that it could continue manufacturing asbestos products); Hickman v. Thomas C. Thomp-
son Co., 592 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Colo. 1984) (product-line theory should be adopted be-
cause it better effectuates the policies behind product liability law); Martin v. Abbott
Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 616, 689 P.2d 368, 388 (1984) (product-line theory is
more appropriate than the mere continuation theory because "[t ]his narrowly drawn rule
strikes a fair balance among the competing considerations of products liability and cor-
porate acquisitions").
97. See Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1979).
98. See Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 451 N.E.2d 195, 464
N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983) (question of fact existed as to whether corporate successor had an
independent duty to warn of the risks of operating a machine without a safety guard).
99. See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980); Leannais v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
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corporate theories.100 The relationship "must be more than cas-
ual and must have a consequential basis connected with the
predecessor. "'0 Moreover, the successor must derive some eco-
nomic benefit from the assumption of service contracts. The re-
lationship otherwise will be deemed too tenuous and casual to
impose on the successor an independent duty to warn. 02 Besides
the contractual assumption of services, the duty to warn may be
derived from control of the instrumentality - the business that
produced the defective product.103 If the knowledge and con-
tinuity of relationship elements are satisfied, the successor will
have a duty to warn, and the justifications for imposing a duty
on the successor are substantially similar to those policies justi-
fying the product-line and mere continuation approaches.
1 04
4. Justifications for Expanding Corporate Successor
Liability
Several justifications exist for expanding both manufacturer
and successor liability for defective products. The policy reasons
for imposing strict liability on the manufacturers of defective
products, generally, are:
(1) the manufacturer is best able to detect the flaws in a
product it produces and can lessen the potential harm which
may result from the product's use;
(2) the manufacturer which puts the product in the stream
of commerce derives benefits from its purchase; therefore the
manufacturer should bear the burdens which accompany the
product as well; and
(3) there is substantial need for consumer protection from
100. See Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 254, 676 P.2d 1290 (1984);
Wallach, A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subse-
quent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REv. 321, 343 (1976).
101. Stratton, 9 Kan. App. 2d at 259, 676 P.2d at 1294.
102. See id. at 261, 676 P.2d at 1296; see also Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d
75 (3d Cir. 1986); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977) (the mere fact that
asset purchaser's employee made service calls to the original owner did not give rise to a
duty to warn); Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Em-
rich v. Kroner, 79 A.D.2d 854, 434 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1980).
103. See Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58
N.Y.U.L. REV. 906, 927 (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at 339-43).
104. That is, the successor who continues the business knows the product and the
operations and is in the best position to remedy the defects or at least warn of the dan-
gers of the products.
[Vol. 40
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Policies for holding a successor liable for the harm caused
by a predecessor include:
(1) protection and preservation of a remedy for post-disso-
lution claimants;
(2) unfairness of allowing manufacturers to avoid liability;
(3) the prediction and minimization of the risks of defects
is easily borne by the successor corporation; and
(4) the successor is in a better position to obtain insurance
to cover the costs of defective products and injuries
therefrom."'0
Perhaps the best practical justification for expanding suc-
cessor liability is the market justification theory, in which the
present and future liabilities of the acquired corporation are ad-
equately reflected in the purchase price paid by the successor
corporation. 10 7 Once the buyer becomes a target for the injured
claimant, the bargaining process is instituted. At that point the
buyer either may walk away from the purchase or estimate the
cost of potential liabilities and begin negotiating with the seller.
This process places the costs of liability upon the guilty seller,
and the purchase price automatically and adequately should re-
flect the actual liabilities. 08 This market negotiation process, if
functioning properly, seems to lead to fair results; its utilization,
however, is not free from questions. Estimating future liability
and adequately valuing the purchase price to reflect those liabil-
ities is extremely difficult, especially in cases in which a party's
injuries will not occur until some time in the future.
The arguments against holding the corporate successor lia-
ble include: the successor was not at fault because the predeces-
sor corporation was morally responsible; the imposition of liabil-
ity on the successor will not deter any misbehavior; and
105. See Note, supra note 60.
106. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974); Ketterling,
supra note 56, at 779-80; Schulman, supra note 61, at 592.
107. See Schulman, supra note 61, at 593. Based on the notion that the successor
must take the good with the bad, the bad often is characterized as the less-than-fair-
market-value purchase price. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill.
App. 3d 1141, 433 N.E.2d 1104 (1982).
108. Kettering, supra note 56, at 775; Schulman, supra note 61, at 593. If actual
liability exceeds the discounted expected liability, the successor paid more for the prede-
cessor than it was worth. For detailed examples, see id. at 776, n. 88.
1989]
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compensation should come from the actual wrongdoer and not
an "innocent" third party. Also, a need exists for finality in
awarding damages for claims against corporations so as not to
"stymy" the transferability of assets. 10 9 The problems in esti-
mating and anticipating future damages, which cause uncer-
tainty and difficulty in valuing the corporate predecessor, create
additional doubts concerning the propriety of imposing liablity
on successors.
10
Despite arguments disfavoring corporate successor liability,
the policy justifications constitute a strong basis for continuing,
if not expanding, successor liability for product-related inju-
ries-at least to the extent of assessing these companies for com-
pensatory damages. The question remaining is whether these
policies extend so far as to justify penalizing the successor for a
predecessor's wrongdoings in the form of punitive damage
liability.
IV. MERGING THEORIES OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY WITH THE
IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: ARE THE POLICIES BEHIND
EACH THEORY RECONCILABLE?
An issue confronting courts frequently, primarily in the con-
text of asbestos and other mass tort litigation, is whether tradi-
tional successor liability theories can and should be extended to
include recovery of punitive damages. Courts will find little pre-
cedent that will help them resolve this issue. Nevertheless, be-
cause of the influx of mass tort claims, courts can anticipate that
this issue will arise more often in the near future.
- A. Theories Upon Which Successors Have Been Held Liable
for Punitive Damages
The courts confronted with claims for punitive damages
against successors generally have extended traditional theories
of successor liability to cover both compensatory and punitive
damages."'
109. See Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of Suc-
cessor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REv. 1559, 1560 (1984).
110. See id. at 1562.
111. A few jurisdictions imposed punitive damages on successors without fully justi-
fying their decisions. See, e.g., Investor's Preferred Life Ins. Co. v. Abraham, 375 F.2d
[Vol. 40
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1. Merger Agreement and Statutory Merger
The clearest situation in which punitives should be imposed
on a successor corporation occurs when the successor contractu-
ally assumes all liabilities, duties, and obligations of its prede-
cessor. The courts in the Celotex asbestos cases have been fairly
consistent, with the exception of cases discussed later, in holding
that the acquisition between Celotex Corporation and Panacon
amounted to a merger in which the successor contractually as-
sumed all liabilities, including punitive damages claims. In Celo-
tex v. Pickett 12 the court held that imposing liability met both
the deterrence and punishment purposes of punitive damages.113
Certain cases that preceded Pickett shed further light on the
reasons and justifications for allowing punitive recovery. For ex-
ample, in Krull v. Celotex114 the court reasoned:
Corporations are largely the molders of their own destinies in
acquisition transactions: They may buy assets without assum-
ing liabilities, they may buy stock and preserve the acquired
company as a subsidiary (insulating the parent from subsidiary
liabilities), they may engage in upstream or downstream merg-
ers, they may consolidate - there is no need to ring all the
changes with which a knowledgeable corporate practitioner is
familiar.1 "
The court suggested that the buyer is in the best bargaining po-
291 (10th Cir. 1967) (held successor liable for punitives when evidence sustained finding
that perpetration of the fraud on plaintiff was committed by president of the corporation
with which the corporate defendant merged); Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp.
1163 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973) (successor acquired assets of
predecessor and court held there was no reason not to include punitive damages, based
solely on the net worth of the defendant-successor in malicious prosecution and defama-
tion suit). In a well-reasoned opinion, a Wisconsin court imposed punitive damages on
both the predecessor and successor corporations since both parties' conduct was outra-
geous and both had knowledge of the defective machine yet neither took any precaution-
ary measures to remedy the situation. See Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97
Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980).
112. 490 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1986) (merger agreement whereby all debts, liabilities, and
duties of predecessor were enforceable against successor, coupled with Florida merger
statute, FLA. STAT. § 607.231(3) (1983), imposed direct, not vicarious, liability on
successor).
113. See. id. at 38.
114. 611 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (court held that successor unconditionally
assumed all liabilities according to the merger agreement).
115. Id. at 149.
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sition and can negotiate and choose the avenue he wishes to pur-
sue, taking into consideration all liabilities that may be attached
to the transaction. Thus, when the buyer and seller are dealing
at arm's length and the merger agreement clearly states that the
buyer will assume all liabilities, the buyer is treated essentially
as a purchaser with notice of present and future claims against
the predecessor. Imposing liability for punitive damages merely
effectuates the market transaction into which the parties
entered.
In Wall v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp.'i6 the successor-
defendant argued that punitive damages should not be awarded
against it for the transgressions of its predecessor-in-interest.
Moreover, he paralleled the award to one against the estate of a
deceased wrongdoer. 117 The court held that the transferee corpo-
ration could not escape liability for three reasons. First, the cor-
poration expressly or impliedly assumed liability. Second, tort
claims include punitive damages. Finally, Texas law permits
awards of punitive damages against asbestos manufacturers." s
Accordingly, the court again held Celotex liable for punitive
damages.119
Several other courts have imposed liability for punitive
damages, using similar reasoning, merely by extending the tradi-
tional merger/consolidation/continuation exceptions to allow re-
covery for punitive damages. 20 For example, in Hanlon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 2' the court held that if the defend-
ant could show that at some point punitive damages were being
used merely to compensate the victim and that further awards
would not promote the goal of punitive damages, it would recon-
116. 602 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Tex. 1985) ("The acquiring corporation cannot accept
the good without the bad, absent an unlikely agreement with the acquired entity, and
jettison inchoate liabilities into a never-never land of transcorporate limbo."). Id. at 255.
117. See id. at 255.
118. See id. at 255-56.
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Iowa
1982) (defendant did not commit culpable acts but court imposed punitives to deter
future conduct); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
aff'd, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.1985); Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484 A.2d 521 (Del. Super.
1984) (question of fact existed as to corporation's continuance of the harm-causing prod-
uct line, and court precluded retention of personnel and summary judgment on the issue
of punitive damages); Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (successor in large part a continuation of the predecessor).
121. 599 F. Supp. at 376.
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sider the decision. 122 In all the decisions, the courts considered
whether the purposes of punitive damages were furthered by im-
posing liability; this important consideration must not be
overlooked.
2. Mere Continuation
The court in Brotherton v. Celotex Corp.123 used the mere
continuation theory,124 citing both Martin v. Johns-Manville
Corp.25 and Wilson v. Fare Well Corp.'26 for the provisions un-
derlying each theory. The court held that the Wilson continua-
tion test "would assist our courts in striking a fair balance be-
tween an individual's recovery and a corporation's liability in
situations where the actual wrongdoer no longer exists and the
successor is sufficiently connected to the culpable conduct."
2 7
The two combined theories furthered the purposes for imposing
punitive damages; therefore, courts could use them to determine
if punitive damages were recoverable against the successor
corporation. 28
3. Degree of Identity
In Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.29 the court held that
punitive damages were recoverable if the plaintiff could show
"such a degree of identity of the successor with its predecessor
as to justify the conclusion that those responsible for the reck-
122. See id. at 381.
123. 202 N.J. Super. 145, 493 A.2d 1337 (Ct. Law 1985).
124. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
125. 322 Pa. Super. 348, 469 A.2d 655, vacated, 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985).
126. 140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (Ct. Law 1976). In Wilson the court found
both a de facto merger and a complete continuation of the selling corporation's business
for two reasons: (1) the seller sold all its inventory, machinery, patents, buildings, trade-
marks, and good will; and (2) the buyer paid half the purchase price in stock, assumed
most of the seller's contractual and property liability, and employed all management and
personnel.
127. Brotherton, 202 N.J. Super. at 157, 493 A.2d at 1341.
128. Id. at 158, 493 A.2d at 1342.
129. 322 Pa. Super. 348, 469 A.2d 655 (1983), vacated, 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088
(1985). Although Wilson has a complicated procedural history and the decision to vacate
was based on the insufficiency of evidence to support apportionment of damages, the
vacation was with respect to the Superior Court's affirmance of the trial court's denial of
a new trial. The court remanded the case for a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
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less conduct of the predecessor will be punished, and the succes-
sor will be deterred from similar conduct."130 If a change in cor-
porate identity was not accompanied by a major change in the
predecessor's shareholders, officers, directors, and management,
punitives were allowed.131 The court determined that the issue
of a sufficient degree of identity must be resolved on a case-by-
case basis.132 Following a lengthy discussion of punitive damages
in products liability cases, the court responded to the criticisms
made by Judge Friendly in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. 3 3 and held that allowing punitive damages was proper
under the circumstances. 3 " The manufacturing corporations ap-
pealed,135 and the court held that the conduct described by the
worker did not demonstrate the culpable mental state necessary
to prove conduct that would permit punitive damages. 36 The
court expressly excluded consideration of the "Superior Court's
treatment of the issue of the circumstances under which a suc-
cessor corporation may be held liable in punitive damages for
outrageous acts of its predecessor. 1, 37 Therefore, the appellate
court left the "degree of identity" standard intact, and that
standard continues to be a method for determining successor lia-
bility for punitive damages.
Whether courts label the theory a "continuation" or "degree
of identity," the result has been the same: the successor corpora-
tion is so similar, if not identical, to its predecessor in terms of
corporate composition that the basic identity is virtually un-
changed. Since one corporation is merely a "continuation" of the
other, the courts have justified imposing punitive damages on
either the predecessor or successor if the punishment and deter-
rence goals are satisfied,
4. De Facto Merger
The court in Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
130. Id. at 372, 469 A.2d at 667.
131. See id. at 371, 469 A.2d at 667.
132. See id. at 372 n.22, 469 A.2d at 667 n.22.
133. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
134. See Martin, 322 Pa. Super. at 368, 469 A.2d at 665.
135. See Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 508 Pa. 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985).
136. See id. at 177, 494 A.2d at 1100.
137. Id. at 177 n.16, 494 A.2d at 1100 n.16.
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Co.1,38 used the de facto merger theory to allow recovery for pu-
nitive damages against a successor that exchanged stock for all
of the predecessor's business assets and goodwill. The predeces-
sor agreed to dissolve as soon as possible. 139 The court expressly
declined to follow In re Related Asbestos Cases1 40 and stated
that the form of the acquisition dictated what liabilities de-
scended, not the similarity or continuity of the predecessor's
product line."" The court listed five questions to consider in de-
termining whether the transaction, cast in the form of a sale of
assets, achieved the same practical results as a merger:
(1) Was the consideration paid solely stock of the pur-
chaser or its parent;
(2) did the purchaser continue the same enterprise after
the sale;
(3) did the shareholders of the seller become shareholders
of the purchaser;
(4) did the seller liquidate;
(5) did the buyer assume the liabilities necessary to carry
on the business of the seller[?]142
The court focused on whether the reorganization amounted
to a merger. The court disposed of that issue by holding that
"all the indicia of a merger [were] present"14 and presumed pu-
nitive damages thereafter.
B. Theories Upon Which Courts Have Denied Recovery of
Punitive Damages Against Successors
A minority of jurisdictions have held that punitive damages
were not recoverable against a corporate successor. For example,
a California court decided a case in favor of Celotex Corpora-
tion, the same defendant that was held liable in cases previously
138. 187 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 232 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1986).
139. See id. at 1434, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
140. 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
141. See Marks, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1435, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
142. Id. at 1436, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
143. Id. at 1438, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 599. Both reorganizations were mergers, for all
intents and purposes; thus, all liabilities, including punitive damages of the subsidiary,
were transferred to the surviving corporation. The court offered no further justification.
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discussed.144 In In re Related Asbestos Cases'45 the court chose
not "to expand the aegis of punitive damage liability in the con-
text of mass product liability litigation.' 4 The court considered
the theories that permit the recovery of punitives 147 and held the
company not liable.
The court rejected the product-line theory although Celotex
continued several of its predecessor's product lines and held that
this action did not create an issue of fact to preclude summary
judgment on the punitive damages issue. 48 The court distin-
guished the facts of Moe v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co.1
49
and reinforced California's restrictive law in identifying the
party responsible for the wrong.150 The court held that Celotex
was an ongoing concern and not a continuation of its predessor
for several reasons: it purchased the stock of its predecessor; it
continued to operate under its former board and officers; and
none of the predecessor-shareholders became shareholders of the
successor. 165 The court reasoned that the successor was doing
nothing to perpetuate the alleged malicious conduct of the pred-
ecessor and, therefore, no award of punitives was warranted.'52
The court next addressed the agency theory and held that
although the successor had retained several of the predecessor's
employees, "this fact alone, without evidence of the employee's
malicious conduct, without evidence of [the successor's] knowl-
edge thereof, and without evidence that [the successor] was not
a separate and distinct corporate entity" did not create an issue
of fact concerning ratification of the conduct. 53 Thus, the de-
144. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
145. 566 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
146. Id. at 823 (emphasis in original).
147. The court stated three theories upon which a successor corporation may be
liable for punitive damages:
(1) under the doctrine of Ray v. Alad Corp., [19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136
Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977)]; (2) under the principles embodied in Moe v. Tran-
samerica Title Insurance Co., [21 Cal. App. 3d 289, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971)];
(3) by analogy to section 349(b), that is, on the basis of the principal's knowl-
edge, authorization or ratification of an agent's malicious act.
566 F. Supp. at 821.
148. See id. at 823.
149. 21 Cal. App. 3d 289, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971).
150. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. at 823.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 824.
153. Id. at 825.
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fendant's motion for summary judgment was granted."
In Catasauqua Area School District v. Raymark Indus-
tries'55 the court based its decision not to allow punitive damage
recovery on the plaintiff's insufficiency of evidence.' 56 No evi-
dence existed that any of the predecessor's asbestos-containing
roofing felts were present or installed in the high school. Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff failed to present evidence that asbestos
products manufactured by a successor corporation were actually
used in repair work.' The court held that in deciding a succes-
sor's liability, the threshold consideration is whether the plain-
tiff's remedies against the original manufacturer are completely
destroyed. 158 Since the predecessor corporation was still a viable
corporation and was an active defendant in the litigation, the
court held that imposing successor liability was unjustifiable. 9
In Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp.60 the successor com-
pany immediately improved the injury-causing product. Since
the new management demonstrated greater concern for the con-
suming public, the court refused to award exemplary damages.
Because the successor's efforts were in direct contradiction with
the egregious conduct of the predecessor, the court held that the
imposition of punitive damages would have had no deterrent
value.' 6' On appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed the finding of lia-
bility and modified certain damages awards, but left intact the
decision not to award punitive damages.6 2 Agreeing with the
trial judge's reliance upon improved industry standards, the
154. See id. at 827.
155. 662 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Penn. 1987).
156. The court granted summary judgment for the predecessor since the plaintiff's
evidence was insufficient to show outrageous conduct in selling its products for use in
plaintiff's schools or in failing to warn him of the dangers. See id. at 70.
157. See id. at 65-67.
158. See id. at 68.
159. See id. at 69. The court stated that the purpose behind the product-line excep-
tion was to provide relief to victims who otherwise would have no remedy. The court
cited Schweitner v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 65 Bankr. 794 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986), for
the premise that when the seller is still viable, "the tort victim has not been deprived of
a remedy and there is no need to impose successor liability on another corporation."
Catasauqua, 662 F. Supp. at 69 (citing Schweitner, 65 Bankr. at 803). Moreover, the
court explicitly stated that if the seller ceased to exist, the successor would be held liable
under either the merger or continuation exceptions to successor nonliability. See id.
160. 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975), modified, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
161. Id. at 1098.
162. See Drayton, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
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court concluded that punitive damages were not necessary as a
deterrent to future misconduct."8 3
C. Policies Behind Choosing a Particular Form of
Acquisition
Corporate purchasers consider several factors in determin-
ing how to structure the purchase of another corporation, reor-
ganize an existing corporation, or form a new corporation. First,
purchasers analyze the tax impact of acquiring the corporation.
The nature of the consideration paid to the seller or shareholder
determines whether a transaction qualifies as a tax-free reorgan-
ization or a wholly or partially taxed reorganization.' 64 Second,
purchasers must consider certain corporate law considerations,
such as the preservation of the seller's net operating loss carry-
over and competing claims of shareholders and creditors whose
interest may be affected in the transfer.165 Third, corporate reor-
ganizers must consider the accounting consequences resulting
from each type of transaction.'66 Finally, reorganizers must as-
sess legal and regulatory considerations. 16 7 By being aware of the
various consequences of each transaction, the parties can better
prepare the reorganization and prevent any unexpected
163. See id. at 366. Ohio courts rejected Drayton's interpretation of Temple v.
Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), for the proposition that a
manufacturer is only liable for defects in the design of a product when it was negligent in
creating that design. See Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131 (6th
Cir. 1984).
164. Bangser & Sinanian, Legal Considerations Relating to Structuring, Planning,
and Negotiation of the Various Types of Acquisitions and Mergers in BusINss AcQuIsI-
TIONS 3, 4 (J. Herz & C. Baller 2d ed. Supp. 1986). Tax consequences are probably the
most important consideration, apart from assumption of debts and obligations. See J.
LEVIN, CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuisITIONS-SUMMARY OF THE BASIc TAX, SEC, Ac-
COUNTING, AND CORPORATE CONSIDERATIONS (1984); McGaffey & Hunt, Continuity of
Shareholder Interest in Acquisitive Corporate Reorganizations, 59 TAXES 659 (1981).
165. See Bangser & Sinanian, supra note 164, at 4.
166. See id.
167. See id. The wrath of securities regulations and the increased attention ac-
corded hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts has spawned legislative and judicial ac-
tion. The securities laws are particularly applicable when one of the parties to a transac-
tion is publicly held or when the transaction will include the issuance and distribution of
securities. Extensive recording and filing of securities is required. See Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk
(1982). For a compilation of numerous articles on the subject of mergers and acquisi-
tions, see Mergers and Acquisitions, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 21-42.
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All three types of corporate reorganization - statutory
merger, the asset acquisition, and the stock acquisition - have
similar advantages and disadvantages. 16 8 One disadvantage is
the assumption of liability for legal claims brought, or about to
be brought, against the predecessor. If a corporate purchaser's
primary motivation is to avoid all liability for present and future
products liability claims, the form of transaction might make a
difference.6 9 Clearly, the surviving corporation in a statutory
merger or in a stock acquisition remains liable for all the liabili-
ties and obligations of the enterprise.
Conversely, in a pure asset acquisition the purchaser may
limit assumption of liabilities in the acquisition agreement.170
Still, some possibility exists that a successor will be held liable
for the debts and obligations of its predecessor; 17 however,
mechanisms for avoiding or minimizing this risk are available.172
First, the purchaser should use cash for consideration, instead of
stock, to avoid imposition of liability because of the de facto
merger theory of successor liability. 73 Second, part of the
purchase price should be placed in escrow in accordance with
statutes governing claims against liquidated corporations.74
Third, the buyer should require the seller to remain in existence
for as long as possible after the sale so that the seller remains a
viable source from which debts can be paid. 7 ' Finally, the buyer
should secure indemnity agreements from the seller's sharehold-
ers and use non-negotiable promissory notes to evidence any de-
ferred purchase price amounts. 76
Corporate purchasers and sellers have numerous bargaining
tools for achieving the exact type of corporate form they desire
and have various methods for minimizing assumption of liability
prior to acquisition. Although negotiations may be complex,
168. See Bangser & Sinanian, supra note 164, at 4.
169. Id.
170. Other advantages of an asset acquisition include: elimination of unwanted as-
sets, elimination of minority shareholders, limitations on the shareholder's appraisal
rights, and allocation of the purchase price and write up of assets. See id. at 6-9.
171. See id.
172. See Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 85 Nev. 276, 454 P.2d 24 (1969).
173. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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"they should become a normal part of business transactions," 1"
and suitable preparations can be made to combat the possibility
of unanticipated successor liabilities."'
D. Methods of Effectuating the Goals of Successor Liability
and Punitive Damages
Punishment and deterrence, the objectives of punitive dam-
ages, can be achieved only if the predecessor directly or indi-
rectly bears the responsibility for punitive damages.17 One
method of directly punishing the predecessor is a qualified ver-
sion of the "degree of identity" test.180 A method of indirectly
punishing the predecessor is a "conduit-potential" theory.181 Fi-
nally, a "totality of the circumstances" method, which requires
the court to consider evidence on a combination of factors bor-
rowed from various theories of successor liability, advances both
the punishment and deterrence goals of punitive damages.
1. Degree of Identity
If the successor shares certain similarities with its predeces-
sor, a court will assess punitive damages against the successor if
the plaintiff advances the goals of punishment and deterrence.8 2
The degree of identity test "focuses on substance rather than
emphasizing form. . .[and] asks whether enough of the prede-
cessor effectively has been absorbed into the successor so that by
punishing the successor, in effect, the predecessor is being pun-
ished." 8 ' Ketterling suggests that the "degree of identity" test
should be qualified because of the potential for misuse if a court
misinterprets the test and holds a successor liable merely be-
cause a single culpable individual remains with the successor
corporation.18 4 The "'[d]egree of identity' should be determined
177. Turner, 397 Mich. at 428, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
178. Id.
179. See Ketterling, supra note 56, at 782.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 783.
182. Id.; Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 371, 469 A.2d 655, 667
(1983), vacated, 508 Pa, 154, 494 A.2d 1088 (1985).
183. Ketterling, supra note 56, at 784.
184. See id. at 785 n.162. For example, Ketterling believes misuse was clear in
Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d 1337 (Ct. Law 1985).
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by a consideration of the degree to which shareholders, officers,
directors, and management personnel of the predecessor have
been incorporated into the corporate entity of the successor. ' ",
The use of this qualified "degree of identity" test serves the
goals of punitive damage liability because the successor is suffi-
ciently identified with the predecessor so that the predecessor is
punished.186 Consequently, "when potential wrongdoers witness
the eventual punishment of a former wrongdoer, they will be de-
terred from such misconduct in the future.
'18 7
2. Conduit-Potential Test
The conduit-potential test, also proposed by Ketterling, in-
directly punishes the predecessor by placing responsibility in the
successor to assess the amount of punitive damages possible at
the time of purchase and prior to the predecessor's dissolu-
tion.88 In this test the purchase price is discounted by the
amount of damages the successor reasonably could have fore-
seen, thus punishing the predecessor by reducing the amount it
otherwise would have received for assets.18 9 "Lacking knowledge
of its responsibility, the successor should not be held accounta-
ble for the predecessor's punitive damage liability."m1 0 The con-
duit-potential test serves the objectives of punitive damages if
an effective conduit is based on "what amount of punitive dam-
ages the successor should have been able to foresee and there-
fore transfer to the predecessor."1"1 The prospective use of the
conduit-potential test adequately justifies the imposition of pu-
nitive damages on a successor corporation and limits such an im-
185. Ketterling, supra note 56, at 785. This test differs from the original Martin
test. That test indicated that a sufficient degree of identity is found when a few share-
holders, officers, directors, or management personnel continue in the successor, if those
remaining were directly responsible for the misconduct. See Martin, 322 Pa. Super. at
371, 469 A.2d at 667.
186. Ketterling, supra note 56, at 785.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 786.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 787-88. "The plaintiff would bear the burden ... of show[ing] that the
successor may have been or should have been aware of its predecessor's misconduct and
the resulting probability of punitive damages. The burden of persuasion then would be
on the successor to show what amount, if any, of punitive damage liability it reasonably
could have foreseen." Id.
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position based on the successor's good faith and knowledge at
the time of acquisition:
It is clear that once corporations considering such transactions
become aware of the possibility of successor products liability,
they can make suitable preparations. Whether this takes the
form of products liability insurance, indemnification agree-
ments or of escrow accounts, or even a deduction from the
purchase price is a matter to be considered between the par-
ties. Negotiations may be complex, but, with familiarity, they
should become a normal part of business transactions. 92
3. Successor Liability for Punitive Damages Based on the
Totality of the Circumstances
A final method of effectuating the goals of successor liability
and punitive damages considers factors from several different
theories: mere continuation, degree of identity, product-line, de
facto merger, and conduit-potential. Because many factors of
these theories overlap, courts may not need a single distinct
method for imposing punitive liability on successors; they could
effectively use a totality of the circumstances test.'93 Courts
should consider factors including, but not limited to:
(1) what "form" of transaction took place;
194
(2) to what degree shareholders, officers, directors, and
employees of the predecessor were incorporated into the
192. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883
(1976).
193. The court used a totality of the circumstances test for determining successor
liability for an employee's sex discrimination in Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F.
Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1983 (1987). In holding the succes-
sor not liable, the court balanced several factors including:
1) whether the successor had notice of the charge;
2) ability of predecessor to provide relief;
3) substantial continuation of business operations;
4) use of the same plant;
5) substantially the same work force and supervisory personnel;
6) substantially the same job existing under the same circumstances;
7) employer used same machines, equipments, methods of production and
used similar product.
584 F. Supp. at 424.
194. If the facts clearly establish a merger, versus a pure asset acquisition, then lia-
bility is determined by the traditional nonliability rule and its explicit exceptions. See
supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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(3) what business similarities exist between the predeces-
sor and successor, for example, production of the same or simi-
lar product, maintenance of the same organizational structure,
service to the same or similar customers, use of good will,"96
and use of similar marketing techniques; 9 7
(4) what purposes and goals the companies to the transac-
tion were attempting to achieve;
95
(5) to what extent the purchaser considered liabilities and
contingencies during the negotiations process so that the
purchase price clearly reflects foreseeable punitive damage
liability;"9
(6) whether the objectives of punishment and deterrence
are served if the court imposes punitive liability on the
successor.
2 0 0
The form of transaction a corporate successor chooses is im-
portant in determining liability. In states that have statutes pre-
scribing liability, the form of acquisition may completely dispose
of the issue. As discussed previously, a pure asset acquisition
195. For the elements necessary to determine a sufficient degree of identity, see
supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
196. "The good will and trade name do give the successor an interest in the reputa-
tion of the predecessor for excellence in production. The revelation of past production
failures injures the reputation and deprives the successor of the only benefit it has pur-
chased. Thus, the successor has lost the benefit of its bargain." Woody v. Combustion
Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
197. This theory considers substantially the same factors as the product-line excep-
tion in Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). This
theory, however, makes product line one factor among many to consider in determining
liability.
198. If the facts indicate an attempt by the potentially culpable corporation to use
some acquisition technique merely to escape liability, the court should consider that bad-
faith purpose in determining which corporation should be punished. See Ortiz v. South
Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975).
199. This factor encompasses several theories, including the market justification
theory, see supra note 107, and the conduit-potential theory, see supra notes 185-89, and
the notions of foreseeability, corporate valuation, bona fide purchaser, acquisitions and
negotiation. The likelihood of success is greater in negotiated transactions, in which the
bidder's exposure to litigation would be reduced. See S. FRAIDIN, STRUCTURING THE
FRIENDLY DEAL 349-62 (1987).
200. The courts first should consider if the predecessor is still in existence and, if so,
whether the predecessor is a viable entity that could bear the burden of punitive damage
liability. If both factors are present, a court can best advance the goals of punitives by
assessing the predecessor to the extent it has resources. Thereafter, in order to advance
the punishment and deterrence goals, a court should hold both the predecessor and suc-
cessor liable for punitives.
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may not result in successor liability whereas stock mergers will.
The degree to which the successor incorporates the share-
holders, officers, directors, and employees of the predecessor is a
relevant factor because courts only will impose punitive liability
if the sucessor can be identified sufficiently with the predecessor.
The less a successor changes management and personnel when
an acquisition occurs, the less the identity of the predecessor
changes. The "transition" from predecessor to successor corpo-
rations essentially is a formality and may indicate an effort to
avoid liability by the predecessor corporation. This factor effec-
tively indicates whether a successor corporation's identity has
remained virtually unchanged so that punitive damage liability
can and should be imposed.
The third factor, business similarities between the predeces-
sor and successor, determines any differences in identity of the
two corporations. Again, if the "identities" remain substantially
the same, courts should impose punitive damages on the
successor.
The goals the companies attempt to achieve reveal whether
they consummated the transaction solely to avoid liability. If so,
this factor alone is significant in a consideration of all the cir-
cumstances. This motive, coupled with one or more of these fac-
tors, justifies successor liability.
Prudent corporations consummating a merger or acquisition
will consider both punitive and compensatory damages liability
in the negotiation process. These corporations often agree to off-
set the purchase price by the foreseeable liability that courts
may impose on the successor because of the predecessor's past
conduct. Courts should not overlook evidence of a negotiation
process and the extent the purchase price reflects these liabili-
ties. These factors may reduce or eliminate compensatory and
punitive damages if evidence shows that the companies dis-
cussed and resolved the liability issue. The courts should ex-
amine what damages were foreseeable when this agreement was
made and, if the plaintiff suffered damages beyond what the
parties foresaw, find the corporations liable for the additional
amount.
Finally, the courts obviously should weigh whether the
objectives of punishment and deterrence are served if they im-
pose punitive liability on the successors. If punitive damage lia-
bility does not punish the successor or deter its wrongful con-
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duct, then the courts should not award punitive damages. If
actual damages have compensated the plaintiff sufficiently, any
effort to find additional liability works against the policies
deeply embedded in the law of damages.
By considering each of these factors, as opposed to adopting
or rejecting a particular theory of successor liability, courts are
better equipped to determine the propriety of imposing punitive
liability in a broad spectrum of situations. If substantial weight
is given to one factor, a court may justify liability although no
other factors exist if the court ultimately punishes the guilty
party for his misconduct. Similarly, evidence of the mere exis-
tence of each factor taken as a whole may justify liability. Since
each factor is important, a totality of the circumstances inquiry
better suits the needs of both the injured plaintiff and the cor-
porate defendants.
Presumably, corporations contemplating reorganization are
sophisticated bodies capable of structuring the deal to minimize
future complications. If the purchase price adequately reflects
foreseeable liabilities, a court should absolve the successor from
punitive damages. If the parties failed to consider future liabili-
ties at the bargaining table or if the successor could have fore-
seen liabilities occurring, a court may hold the successor puni-
tively liable. In the absence of information concerning
negotiations and purchase-price valuation and if the successor in
essence "absorbed" the predecessor, the successor should be lia-
ble based on one or more of the factors listed. The argument
that the form of the acquisition makes no difference in deter-
mining a manufacturer's liability is legitimate.20 1 Essentially, ad-
vocates of this position argue that if the successor looks like the
predecessor and smells like the predecessor - regardless of the
form of corporate transaction - and if punitive damages would
effectively punish the wrongdoer and deter the successor and
other manufacturers similarly situated, punitive damages should
be recoverable against successor corporations.
V. CONCLUSION
Punitive damages and successor liability are separate bodies
201. See supra note 72.
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of law and serve separate functions. If one attempts to merge
the objectives of punitive damages - punishment and deter-
rence of wrongful conduct - with the grounds for imposing lia-
bility on corporate successors, certain inconsistencies arise. The
few courts that have been faced with this combination of two
distinct bodies of law employed theories based on factors such as
continuity of officers, directors, shareholders, and employees,
similarity of product-line, and similarity of business enterprise
in general. In adopting these theories, the courts should not ex-
clude one theory, at the expense of overlooking some factor em-
bodied in that theory, that would clearly affect the imposition of
liability for punitive damages. By inquiring into the totality of
the circumstances on a case-by-case basis, the goals of punishing
the guilty party for culpable conduct and deterring future
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